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ABSTRACT
Much of the recent discussion about the relation between pensions and
inflation has emphasized the adverse impact that,the unexpected rise in
inflation had on pension recipients and on the performance of pension funds
during the past 15 years. In contrast, the present paper focuses on the way
that pensions are likely to evolve in response to the expectation of
continued inflation in the future and the uncertainty about the rate of
inflation. The analysis concludes that continued inflation is likely to
alter the form of private pensions (in the direction of partial indexing)
and the nature of pension funding (away from long-term bonds) but that
continued inflation is also likely to induce pensions to finance a growing
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Private pensions playa central role in capital accumulation in the
United States. Like every other aspect of capital accumulation, the pension
system can be profoundly affected by inflation. Even fully anticipated inflation
is far from neutral in its effects because of the fiscal environment within
which pensions function. The uncertainty of future inflation can have major
additional effects.
Much of the recent discussion about the relation between pensions and
inflation has emphasized the adverse impact that the unexpected rise in infla-
tion during the past 15 years has had on pension recipients and on the perfor-
mance of pension funds. In contrast, the present paper focuses on the way that
pensions are likely to evolve in response to the expectation of continued
inflation in the future and to the uncertainty about the rate of inflation. The
first section discusses how expected inflation will influence the size and com-
position of pension assets. The second section considers the relation between
inflation and the structure of pension benefits. The implication of the
uncertainty of future inflation is the subject of the third section.
Unlike the pessimism of much of the recent discussion of the effect of
inflation on pensions, my own conclusion is that the private pension system can
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continue to function effectively in an inflationary econornlf.l The unfortunate
effects that occurred when inflation,caught pensioners and pension fund managers
by surprise should not be confused with an inability to adjust to future
conditions, even uncertain future conditions.2 As I shall explain, the persistence
of a high rate of inflation is likely to increase the share of total saving that
goes into private pensions. Since the tax treatment of pension contributions
allows individuals to save in this way for retirement on the same terms that
they would under a consumption tax,3 the existence of the private pension system
may be one of the few things that prevents the national saving rate from going
even lower in the current inflationary environment.
1. Expected Inflation, Asset Yields and Pension Saving
Although inflation reduces the real net return that portfolio
investors as a whole earn for supplying capital to nonfinancial corporations,
different classes of portfolio investors are affected very differently.4 In
previous papers, I stressed that it is important to distinguish households and
1 More specifically, the private pension system can function effectively in an
inflationary environment unless the inflation rate is so high or so uncertain
that the financial markets themselves no longer function.
2 When Alicia Munnell (1979, p. 26) compares the rates of return earned by pen-
sion funds with the inflation rate and concludes that the pension funds cannot
keep pace with inflation, she fails to separate the effect of unexpected infla-
tion increases that have depressed total portfolio yields from the permanent
effect of expected inflation.
3 This is true only if the limits on pension contributions or pension benefits
are not binding.
4 S~e Feldstein and Lawrence Summers (1976) for evidence on the effects of
inflation on after-tax rates of return in general and the variety of individual
tax rates.-3-
tax-free institutions in a general equilibrium analysis of the effect of infla-
tion on asset prices (Feldstein, 1980a, 198ob). Now I want to look at the other
side of that coin: the implication of investor diversity and yield differences
for private pensions.
More specifically, this section examines how the interaction of
expected inflation and taxes influences (a) the real yield that pensions can
expect to earn; (b) the desirability of pension saving vis-;;;'-vis direct saving
by households; and (c) the mix of assets held by pension funds. The emphasis in
this section is on steady state analysis in which expected asset yields are
constant and expectations are fulfilled.
The impact of expected inflation on pension funds depends on the rux
of assets that are available and in which pension funds invest. Currently, pen-
sion fund assets are divided approximately evenly between corporate equities and
nominal credit market instruments. It is analytically useful, however, to begin
by considering the "pure equity" and "pure debt" cases separately.
1.1 An Equity-Only Economy
Consider first an economy in which there is no debt. Corporations
finance their investments by issuing equity and reinvesting retained earnings.
Pension funds invest only in corporate equities.
With the existing U.S. tax rules, inflation would unambiguously reduce
the return that firms could earn on equity.l Although this extra inflation-
1 This results from historic cost depreciation and the rema1n1ng use of FIFO
inventory accounting. The mitigating effect of deducting nominal interest
payments is temporarily ruled out by assumption.-4-
induced tax at the corporate level affects both households and pensions, the
after-tax yield to households is further depressed by the tax that must be paid
on nominal capital gains.l Thus inflation unambiguously reduces the yield on
equities to pensions by less than the reduction in the yield on equities held
directly by households.
This difference is independent of the short-run capitalization effect
and the longer-run capital accumulation effect. A rise in the expected infla-
tion rate reduces the net-of-tax earnings per unit of capital. Since the share
price per unit of capital falls to capitalize this reduction in earnings, the
yield per dollar of equity capital falls much less.2 In the longer run, the
lower share price per unit of capital induces a reduction in the size of the
capital stock, thereby raising the pretax (and post-tax) rate of return per unit
of capital. Since both of these effects apply equally to households and pensions,
the net yield differential caused by the tax on nominal capital gains remains.
Even in the absence of inflation, pensions can earn a higher yield on
equities than households can. The fact that pensions attract a substantial part
of personal saving but not all of it suggests that there is a positive but less
than infinite elasticity of substitution between pension saving and direct
saving. The increase in the yield spread in favor of pensions should therefore
cause pensions to have a larger share of the total private saving. Of course,
1 An explicit analysis of the effect of inflation on equity yields of households
and pension funds is presented in Feldstein (1980a,b).
2 In the extreme case, the yield per dollar of equity capital might remain per-
manently constant. Munnell (1979) apparently ignores the capitalization effect
and therefore concludes incorrectly that the equity yield per dollar of invested
funds will fall by as much as the decline in the equity yield per unit of
capital.-5-
because the effective tax rate on capital gains is relatively small, the
advantage of the switch is also small and the redistribution of assets would not
be large.l It would nevertheless be in the direction of increasing and
strengthening the role of private pensions.
1.2 A Debt-Only Econ0sY
Consider now a debt-only econoIDlf, or at least an econoIDlf is which all
marginal corporate investments are financed by debt,2 and pension ~lnds invest
exclusively in debt. The effect of a change in inflation in such an econoLW is
both roore complex and more dramatic than in the all equity econor~. The precise
nature of the effect depends on the way that the interest rate responds to
inflation.
The stylized "fact" that the real interest rate remains constant is a
useful starting point.3 Since pension funds are not taxed, a constant real
rate of interest implies that they earn a constant real net rate of interest.
In contrast, the real net yield earned by households drops sharply for each per-
centage point rise in the rate of inflation. If the rate of tax paid by house-
holds is 0, the real net interest rate is rh = (1-0) i - 'If where i is the nomi-
1 The inflation-induced growth of the assets of pension funds would also be
reduced to the extent that households save less in response to the lower real
yield on saving or divert saving into nonportfolio assets like housing and land.
2 Joseph Stiglitz (1973) develops an analysis which shows that under certain
conditions such debt-at-the-margin behavior is optimal under U.S. tax laws.
3 Although Irving Fisher's (1930) theoretical support for the independence of
inflation and the real interest rate is no longer valid in an econoIDlf with a
complex tax structure, the combination of tax rules and government debt policy
can achieve an approximately constant real rate of return; see Feldstein (1980c).-6-
nal rate, n is the rate of inflation, and the h subscript refers to the return to
households. Thus drh/dn = (l-e)(di/dn) - 1 - - 0 when di/dn = 1. If the indi-
vidual tax rate averages 30 percent (0=.3), the real net interest rate would fall
from 2.8 percent when there is a 4 percent nominal interest rate and no infla-
tion to 1.0 percent when there is 6 percent inflation and a 10 percent interest
rate. The yield difference between pension funds (earning a real 4 percent in
both cases) and direct saving nearly triples from 1.2 percent to 3.0 percent.
In this "Fisherian" econoIl\Y, inflation again strengthens the relative
position of pension saving. The absolute real yield remains unchanged and the
relative real yield encourages the substitution of pension saving for regular
direct saving.
An alternative simple view is that the nominal interest rate is deter-
mined as the yield that corporations can afford to pay with a fixed real return
on capital(f,).l The firms' first-order condition is readily shown to be:2
1 This ignores the influence of noncorporate borrowers, government debt policy,
and international capital flows.
2 This is a special case of the result derived in Feldstein, Jerry Green and
Eytan Sheshinski (1978).-7-
The nominal pretax return per unit of capital (f' +~) is exhausted by the tax
on the real return on capital ( T f' where T is the corporate tax rate) plus the
tax on the nominal gains that results from historic cost depreciation (T~~ where
~ measures the increase in taxable profits on a unit of capital per percentage
point increase in inflation),l plus the maximum net yield on debt ((l-Th).
Thus the nominal interest rate is given by
i = f' + ~ .
With f' constant, di/d ~ = (1 -llT )/(1- T ). The value of ~ depends on the rate
of inflation but a reasonable approximation is II = 0.5 (see Feldstein, 1980b,
especially the appendix). Thus with the current 46 percent corporate tax rate,
di/d~ =1.43. The nominal interest rate rises by more than the increase in
inflation, implying that the real yield rises by.43 basis points per percentage
point of inflation.
In this case, inflation actually raises the real yield that pension
funds can earn. Although this effect also reduces the inflation penalty on
household investors, the impact of inflation on the ~ between the household
return (rh) and the pension return (rp) is increased. Since rp = i-~ while
1 This is a linear approximation and also subsumes the excess taxation of nomi-
nal investory profits.-8-
rh = (1-0) i - 1T, d(rp - rh)/d1T = e(di/d1T). With di/d1T = 1.43 and e = 0.3,
the real yield spread rises by more than 40 basis points per percentage point of
inflation.
In an all debt econo~, the truth would probably lie somewhere between
the Fisherian constant-real-yield assumption and the alternative positive effect
of inflation on the real interest rate. Whatever the exact value, a higher rate
of inflation probably raises the real return that pension funds can earn and, by
widening the gap between household and pension yields, encourages a greater role
for pensions in private saving.
1.3 An Economy with Debt and Equity
In a more general econo~ with both debt and equity capital, the
effect of inflation on pension funds is essentially a mixture of the results of
the two simpler analyses.l It is now also possible to examine the effect of
inflation on the mix of assets that pensions will want to hold.2 To simplify
the analysis, I will examine only the 'Fisherian' case in which inflation leaves
the real interest rate unchanged and will ignore the long-run effect on the real
return on capital (f') of induced changes in the capital stock.3
1 This assumes that pension funds behave as separate entities. Fisher Black
(1980) and Irwin Tepper (1980) have noted that, if pension fund decisions are
made as part of the overall corporate financial strategy, it is optimal for the
pension fund to hold only debt while the rest of the corporate financial struc-
ture is adjusted to achieve the desired debt-equity mix for the corporation-cum-
pension as a whole.
2 See the previous footnote.
3 Inflation can be expected to reduce capital intensity (under existing tax
laws) and therefore to raise the real return on capital. But whatever happens
to f' does not change the conclusions of this section about the relative attrac-
tiveness of debt and equity or of pensions and direct saving.-9-
In such an economy, a higher rate of inflation reduces the real net
rate of return on equity for both households and pensions but the reduction for
pensions is less.l The real return on debt remains unchanged for pensions but
falls substantially for households (drh/d~ =-8). Thus inflation slightly lowers
the overall yield on pension funds but, by widening the yield differential in
favor of pensions, induces a switch in private saving in favor of pensions.
The relative yields on debt and equity move in opposite directions for
households and pensions. For pensions, the real yield on debt is maintained
while the real yield on equities falls slightly. For households, the real yield
on debt falls sharply while the real yield on equities talls by less.
Households thus sell debt to pension funds and hold more equity directly.
On balance, it is clear that a positive expected rate of inflation
would not be a problem for the private pension system. The real net return
earned by pension funds is relatively insensitive to inflation and might
actually increase. In any case, the incentive to save through pensions would be
strengthened by the increased differential between the yields on direct saving
and pension saving.
2. Inflation and Pension Benefits
The typical private pension plan provides a retiree with a 'defined
benefit', usually some fraction of his average earnings during the five years
1 Feldstein (1980b) presents explicit calculations with realistic values that
imply that the equilibrium real net yields on equity (with a constant f' = .112)
fall from .0966 for pensions and .0770 for households with no inflation to .0861
for pensions and .0648 for households with a 6 percent inflation.-10-
before retirement with the fraction proportional to his number of years as an
employee of the firm. After retirement, benefits are fixed in nominal dollars;
some firms make periodic voluntary adjustments for inflation. Retirees of
course find that the real value of their monthly pension benefit is continually
reduced by the rising price level.
Constant nominal benefits were obviously designed for an economy with
little or no inflation. For an economy with a constant expected rate of
inflation, the constant nominal benefits should be replaced by constant real
benefits. If the real return earned by the pension fund is unaffected by the
rate of inflation, fully indexed benefits would leave the real present-value
cost of the pension independent of the inflation rate.l
The switch from nominal pensions to indexed pensions would require
either a reduction in the starting value of the pension or a reallocation of
employees' lifetime incomes from wages to pensions. The amounts are significant;
for any given benefit, indexing a single-life annuity for a man age 65 with a 6
percent inflation rate would raise the cost of the pension by approximately 50
percent. This could be financed by a one-third reduction in the starting value
1 In the absence of an indexed pension, a retiree might try to substitute a
constant real stream for the constant nominal stream by saving some of the pen-
sion benefit in early years. However, since the retiree must pay tax on the
interest and dividends that he earns on any such saving, he cannot achieve the
equivalent stream. This could be remedied by allowing retirees to "rollover"
any part of their pension income into an account where interest and dividends
accumulate tax free.-11-
of the pension, or roughly a 5 to 10 percent decrease in wages, or some com-
bination of the two.
Although employees and firms have not yet faced and resolved this
choice, an increasing use of (partially) indexed pensions is likely to evolve
in future years. Some reduction in the starting value of the pension would pro-
bably be used, especially for long-service employees, to avoid
over-pensioning.I But on balance the move to indexing is likely to increase
the total size of pension saving.2
3. Uncertain Inflation
The uncertainty of inflation influences the optimal extent of pension
indexing and the likely composition of pension assets. It is important
to distinguish unanticipated changes in the price level from unanticipated
changes in the expected future inflation rate. A one-time rise in the price
level (with no change in expected inflation) lowers the real value of nominal
assets but leaves the real value of e~uities unchanged.3 In contrast, a rise
in the expected future rate of inflation leaves the value of short-term bills
unchanged but lowers the nominal (and therefore the real) values of bonds and
I An employee with 30 years service now generally receives a pension e~ual to
60 percent of his final five-year average earnings. For a retiree with average
earnings, social security adds another 46 percent of final year's pay plus 23
percent more for a dependent spouse. The total easily reaches or exceeds 100
percent of real lifetime earnings at a time when family responsibilities,
mortgage payments, and the like are relatively low.
2 Partial indexing and a tax-free rollover of pension income as outlined in
footnote 18 of page 8 would provide more flexibility and avoid the difficult
problem of reducing the initial pension value. Partial indexing of pensions
would also increase pension saving by reducing the postponement of retirement.
3 See Feldstein (1980a).-12-
stocks.1
Without indexing, the vested pension obligations are nominal long-term
liabilities of the firm. The firm can hedge these liabilities by holding long-
term bonds.2 Of course, firms may nevertheless invest in equities because they
believe that the equity yield is high enough to compensate for the reduced
hedging.3 But, since the extra risk of equity investment is borne by the firm's
shareholders, the employees who participate in the pension plan should earn an
implicit nominal return on their forgone wages that is only equal to the nominal
return on riskless bonds.
A fully indexed pension would make all pension obligations real.
Long-term bonds are clearly an inappropriate investment for funding such real
obligations. Stocks can provide a hedge against price level uncertainty, but
only by accepting substantial general uncertainty. Zvi Bodie (1980) has empha-
sized that a portfolio with a minimum-variance real return would be invested
almost completely in short-term debt (with a small amount in commodity futures)
and that the expected return on such a portfolio is approximately zero. If
employees are so risk averse that they choose a fully indexed pension, the
1 See Feldstein (1980a) for an explanation of why stocks respond in this way to
changes in the price level and the rate of inflation.
2 Jere~ Bulow (1980) emphasizes the very sharp distinction between vested and
other anticipated pension liabilities, although not in relation to the current
issue.
3 For the reasons given by Black and Tepper, this equity investment might be
done in the corporation itself with offsetting corporate borrowing. I shall
not, in the remaining paragraphs, distinguish investment in the firm from
investment in the pension portfolio.-13-
implicit real return that they earn on forgone wages should therefore also be
approximately zero. Again, firms may invest in equities, but the shareholders
rather than the pensioners should receive any extra yield in return for bearing
that risk.
If employees choose a partially indexed pension, i.e., one in which
benefits rise less than one-for-one with the price level or in which benefits
depend on the return on the pension fund assets, the firm can invest in a way
that permits giving a higher return to pension participants while compensating
shareholders for any additional risk that they bear. The optimal extent of pen-
sion indexing depends on the risk aversion of employees and the cost, in terms
of the reduction in the expected yield, of investing pension assets to produce a
constant real return.
As Paul Samuelson (1958) noted years ago, an unfunded social security
program can provide an annuity with an implicit real rate of return equal to the
real growth rate of the econoIDlf, probably about 3 percent a year over the next
decade or longer. Although 3 percent is substantially less than the real return
of more than 10 percent that the national as a whole earns on additions to the
stock of plant and equipment (Feldstein and Poterba, 1980), the political
pressure to substitute unfunded social security benefits for private pensions
(or vice versa) is likely to depend on the real after-tax yield that partly
indexed pensions can offer and on the associated risk. If employees were
completely risk averse, the low 3 percent yield on social security would look
good in comparison to Bodie's zero yield on a minimum-variance real return
portfolio. But if employees are willing to accept the risk inherent in a par--14-
tially indexed pension, they can expect to receive an implicit yield that is
much greater than three percent.l
In summary, the form and funding of private pensions will probably
change in the coming decade if inflation continues at recent levels but, unless
employees become much more risk averse, private pensions are likely to continue
to finance a growing share of retirement consumption.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
August 1980, Revised September 1980
1 This yield will of course depend on both the performance of the econo~ and
the changes in tax laws. In particular, indexed depreciation would reduce the
riskiness of equity investment (by reducing the sensitivity of share prices to
the expected rate of inflation) and increase its expected return.-15-
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